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Abstract 
Loan managers’ trust in entrepreneurs can be a useful tool for overcoming 
entrepreneurial firms’ opaqueness. Nevertheless, the possibility for loan managers to leverage 
trust can be affected by differences in the regulative institutions within the banks (type of 
bank) and by place-bound normative institutions (social context). By relying on semi-
structured interviews and a survey of 450 bank-entrepreneur relationships, this study finds 
that a positive impact of trust in lending relationships is sensitive to different place-bound 
normative institutions and to the regulative institutions within the banks. The results are 
robust with respect to potential endogeneity issues. 
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurial firms face major issues in fulfilling their financial needs (Ang 1992). 
Often, their access to additional equity from their current shareholders is constrained because 
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the latter tend to invest their entire wealth in the venture from the very beginning (Ang et al. 
1995; Avery et al. 1998). Additionally, entrepreneurs are reluctant to raise external equity, 
since it may reduce their freedom in managing the firm, it limits non-pecuniary benefits, and 
it implies the implementation of additional control and management tools (Hamilton 2000; 
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 2002). Thus, entrepreneurs tend to rely on banks, which 
grant them the credit they need for survival and the development of entrepreneurial ventures 
(Cassar 2004; de Bettignies and Brander 2007).  
Interestingly, the term credit derives from the Latin creditum, the past participle of the 
Latin verb credere, which means to believe, to trust, but also to provide credit (Morwood 
2005). Indeed, when taking a lending decision, what underpins the loan manager’s analysis of 
the trade-off between risk and return is the assessment of the entrepreneurs’ trustworthiness, 
i.e. their capability and willingness to repay the debt (Howorth and Moro 2006). This holds 
particularly true when banks lend to entrepreneurial ventures that are characterised by a high 
level of opaqueness (Berger et al. 2001). The loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneurs’ 
trustworthiness is thus a decisive component of the lending decision. In spite of the high 
practical relevance, surprisingly limited research has been carried out into the role of trust in 
credit access (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Moro and Fink 2013) and in these studies the effect 
of the social context of the location in which the lending relationship is embedded is not 
explored. 
Mayer et al. (1995) argue that there is no such thing as a given disposition to trust  
and prominent researchers have recently called for putting trust research back into its 
institutional context (Bachman 2011; Bachman and Inkpen 2011), more specifically into the 
institutional context of regions (Fink and Harms 2012; Welter 2011). They criticise 
mainstream research on trust (focusing on a micro perspective) for not fully accounting for 
the complexity of social interaction and its disregard of the actors’ embeddedness in the 
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institutional environment (Fink and Harms 2012; Welter et al. 2004; Welter and Kautonen 
2005). In fact, several studies highlight the relationship between cultural-cognitive elements 
of institutions and trust, pointing out that culture affects norms, values and underlying 
behavioural assumptions that, in turn, influence trust perception and use via cognitive 
processes (Doney et al. 1998). In addition, earlier research  also suggests that trust formation 
and development are affected by the social interactions that are embedded in the institutional 
context (Oba and Semerciöz 2005), which differs across different relationships, places and 
points in time (Jones and George 1998; Meccheri and Pelloni 2006). Interestingly, the role of 
the institutional context is also addressed by research in finance. The role of national as well 
as local culture, which can be understood as aspects of the institutional context, is stressed by 
the works of Bellucci et al. (2010), Degryse and Ongena (2002), Greenman (2013) and Zheng 
et al. (2012). Moreover, earlier research in this field also points out the key role of the 
regulative institutional context in which financing relationships are embedded (Beck et al. 
2003; Haselmann and Wachtel 2010; Moro et al. 2016).  
All in all, it is mandatory to move to a holistic approach that enables researchers to 
gain a realistic understanding of the role of trust embedded in relationships, and thus to 
formulate relevant statements for the specific situation being investigated. With a more 
realistic view on trust the dark side of trust ( Kautonen et al. 2010) and its implications for 
lending relationships also becomes more visible. Earlier research highlighted that, besides its 
favourable aspects, trust also brings about a threat of manipulation (McEvily and Tortoriello 
2011) and the resulting risk of being blind to changing circumstances (Patzelt and Shepherd 
2008; Thorgren and Wincent 2011). Trust was also found to reduce scepticism (Kahneman et 
al. 1982), which may lead to reduced monitoring (Williams 2001) and enhanced risk of fraud 
(Shapiro 1987).  
This study investigates the role of trust in lending relationships from a perspective 
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that considers the institutional context. Following the call of Moro and Fink (2013), it 
investigates the effect of loan managers’ trust in their entrepreneurial clients on the amount of 
overall credit provided to entrepreneurial firms, by focusing explicitly on the institutional 
context in which the lending relationship is embedded. The research investigates the role of 
trust in established relationships only, for the following reasons. First, as trust develops over 
time, loan managers have very little room for exploiting trust when no previous relationship 
exists. In this case, they can only rely on trust if they have had the opportunity to develop it 
outside of the business relationship. Second, banks do not have data about potential 
customers who decided not to apply for a loan. Even in the case of potential customers who 
were refused loans, banks have very little data and loan managers would struggle to complete 
our survey, since they are likely to remember very little about customers they turned down.  
As called for by Molina-Azorín et al. (2012), the methodological approach relies on a 
mixed-methods strategy. We employ a cross-case content analysis of the transcripts of 
narrative interviews with loan managers (i) to investigate the impact of the loan manager’s 
trust in the entrepreneur on the credit amount granted and (ii) to identify place-bound social 
norms and size-related regulations within the banks as the two aspects of the institutional 
context in which the lending relationship is embedded. The findings of the qualitative study 
are compared against the backdrop of the findings from the current literature to develop 
hypotheses that are subsequently tested using regression analysis, based on 450 observations 
collected at nine banks in the Italian regions of Friuli and South Tyrol.  
 We find that, when reintegrated into the institutional context, the positive impact of 
loan managers’ trust in their entrepreneurial clients on credit access is sensitive to different 
place-bound normative institutions: while cultural institutions in South Tyrol foster the role 
of trust in providing credit to entrepreneurial firms, they do not support it in Friuli. Thus, it is 
relevant where your firm operates and applies for loans. We also find that the positive effect 
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of trust on credit access is sensitive to size-related differences in the regulative institutions 
within the banks: while in smaller banks regulative institutions appear to exploit trust as a 
decision criterion, there is high uncertainty as to whether this is the case in larger banks 
where the internal regulations and procedures may preclude the bank’s possibility to exploit 
trust. Anecdotal evidence on unfavourable effects of trust on credit access identified in the 
qualitative data is not reinforced in the quantitative survey. 
 This research is relevant for banks, entrepreneurs and policy makers. The results 
highlight that banks and businesses can leverage trust in diverse social settings and places. 
However, this effect is neither generalisable across different place-based normative 
institutional settings, nor across different regulative institutional settings (i.e. types of banks). 
From the banks’ perspective, this means that specific types of banks can leverage a trust-
based lending strategy in specific types of regional settings. Thus, for small banks where 
credit decisions are taken close to the customer, trust can represent a competitive advantage 
vis-à-vis large banks, whose credit decisions are made at a distance within complex 
organisational structures. Interestingly, this is not only true in tight-knit, closed communities. 
From the entrepreneurial firms’ perspective, dealing with smaller banks that engage in 
relationship lending can be a way to compensate for their limited ability to provide 
convincing facts and figures that document their potential future performance. In practice, 
such strategy requires the entrepreneurs to be frank and open with their loan manager to build 
a trusting relationship. In addition, policymakers need to consider the power of social 
mechanisms, such as trust, as safeguards for behavioural risks in lending transactions when 
they develop regulations. However, even if on average trust-based lending strategies pay in 
some regional institutional contexts, both entrepreneurs as well as banks should keep in mind 
that such strategies also bring about threats such as lock-in effects, over-reliance and late 
acknowledgement of changes in circumstances that should be considered in each individual 
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case. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the 
conceptual framework on which our research is based. Section 3 describes the methodology 
and presents the findings of the qualitative study (formulation of hypotheses) and the 
quantitative study (testing of hypotheses). Section 4 discusses and comments on the findings. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
In view of this study’s aim, we will first explain how financial institutions behave and 
why trust can be relevant for them. Secondly, we will explore the institutional embeddedness 
of trust and how it affects financing decisions. 
Entrepreneurial firms often experience difficulties in obtaining sufficient credit 
funding. Previous research suggests that this problem arises due to information asymmetries 
(Diamond 1984). The limited quantity and quality of information publicly available makes it 
difficult for banks to assess entrepreneurial firms’ creditworthiness. To ensure the repayment 
of the loan, banks can therefore either try to find ways to obtain additional, reliable 
information, which enables them to make a sound lending decision (Moro et al. 2015), or 
resort to coercive means, such as covenants or collateral (Berger and Udell 1995; Moro et al. 
2014). Yet, coercive means carry considerable transaction costs, which make it difficult for 
entrepreneurial firms to fulfil them. Consequently, it is decisive for banks to acquire 
information. 
Traditionally, banks base their risk evaluation on available factual and public 
information, which is collected independently from the relationship between the bank and the 
entrepreneurial firm (‘transaction lending’). However, due to concerns about the quality and 
the quantity of such information banks often aim at acquiring private information, which is 
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derived over time through contact with the entrepreneurial firm, its entrepreneur(s), and its 
community (‘relationship lending’) (Berger and Udell 2006). Such information is often 
subjective and difficult to credibly communicate inside the bank (Stein 2002). Thus, the bank 
should grant the respective loan manager flexibility and discretion for taking lending 
decisions. 
The underlying assumption of both transaction lending and relationship lending is that 
the interests of the bank and the entrepreneur are in conflict. In this thinking, entrepreneurs 
tend to hide as much information as possible in order to avoid any risk of being credit-
constrained because of negative information (Jayaratne and Wolken 1999), or because they 
are concerned that the bank may leak sensitive information to competitors (Rheinbaben and 
Ruckes 2004). In turn, the bank tends to exploit the intensity and strength of the relationship 
in order to increase the amount of information the loan manager can access and, thus, its 
capability to properly evaluate the creditworthiness of the entrepreneur (Howorth et al. 2003; 
Sharpe 1990). Both issues are linked to the intentions of the entrepreneur, which remain 
opaque to the loan manager until they are translated into observable action (Ajzen 1991). 
In entrepreneurial firm-bank relationships information asymmetry can only be 
dismissed as a major potential problem when the loan manager perceives the entrepreneur as 
trustworthy (Luhmann 2000; Mayer et al. 1995; Ring and Van de Ven 1992), that is, as 
someone who takes into consideration the interests of others (perceived benevolence), and 
has high levels of commitment to the same norms and values as the loan manager (perceived 
integrity). This insight moves interpersonal trust-based relationships (Nooteboom 2002) to 
the centre of attention of this research. 
There are different forms of interpersonal trust (for an overview, see Li 2007). The 
strongest form of interpersonal trust is identification-based trust, which implies identification 
with the values and standards of behaviour of the interaction partner (Lewicki and Bunker 
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1996; McAllister 1995). A psychological contract that is based on the self-commitment of the 
interaction partners (Fink and Kessler 2010) replaces formal contractual safeguards (Barney 
and Hansen 1994; Ring and Van de Ven 1992). It is this level of trust that is required in the 
lending relationship to allow the loan manager to dismiss information asymmetry in a given 
customer relationship.  
With the psychological contract, actors make themselves dependent on their 
interaction partners’ future and thus contingent behaviour. We therefore define trust, in line 
with Mayer et al. (1995), as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action 
important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (ibid. 
p. 712). 
The step into a state of vulnerability to the contingent behaviour of the other, which 
Möllering (2001) called a “leap of faith”, is seen as the starting point of identification-based 
trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Nooteboom 2002). Entrepreneurs who provide sensitive 
information to the loan manager take such a leap of faith. At the same time, in relationship 
lending loan managers provide loans to entrepreneurs, even if there is not enough factual and 
public information to fully justify their decision in the first place.  With this risky advance 
performance, they also take a leap of faith. In lending relationships, the power of trust begins 
where facts and figures end. Such leaps of faith require a trustor to perceive trustees as 
trustworthy ( Kautonen et al. 2010). According to Mayer et al. (1995), trustworthiness is 
based on three factors – ability, benevolence, and integrity. The level of interpersonal trust 
depends on the strength of those three factors. Ability looks at aspects such as skills and 
competence. It is domain-specific and cannot necessarily be generalised to other situations. 
Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to voluntarily do good for the trusting 
party, and is relationship-specific. “Integrity is the trustor’s perception that the trustee adheres 
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to a set of principles considered acceptable to the trustor” (Mayer et al. 1995, 729). Thus, the 
perception of trustworthiness requires that the loan manager has knowledge of the 
entrepreneur.  
However, the source of this knowledge does not necessarily lie within the 
professional customer relationship, but can also be rooted in the social context in which both 
entrepreneur and loan manager are embedded. This is because the interpersonal relationship 
and trust between loan managers and entrepreneurs do not evolve and develop in a vacuum. 
Rather, as social individuals, loan managers and entrepreneurs are embedded in the close-knit 
fabric of social relationships. Through this social embeddedness individuals face institutions 
that shape their perceptions and behaviour (Johnston and Selsky 2006; Mathews and Stokes 
2013). For Scott (1995) institutions are: “[…] social structures that have attained a high 
degree of resilience. [They] are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines and artefacts” (ibid. p. 33). Garud et al. (2007) 
characterise these cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements of institutions as 
follows: “the regulative […] guides action through coercion and threat of formal sanction; the 
normative […] guides action through norms of acceptability, morality and ethics; and the 
cognitive guides action through the very categories and frames by which actors know and 
interpret their world” (ibid. p. 958). Sociological institutionalism highlights that social 
identity and the meanings individuals attribute to economic practices have to be taken into 
account in order to understand their behaviour (Jepperson 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Meaning is collectively constructed through the social interactions of individuals who thereby 
create common points of reference for their identities, actions and relationships (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Greenman 2013; Scott 1995). As intentions are formed and translated into 
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action with institutions in play, the behaviour of individuals may not be characterised as 
purely individual but rather as embedded agency (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This notion 
highlights the interplay of individuals and institutions in the genesis of action as the 
observable result of the intention. 
Also in lending relationships, loan managers and entrepreneurs constantly construct 
joint meanings of their perceptions and actions against the background of the specific 
institutional embedding in their interactions. These interpretations of their own and the 
interaction partner’s identities and actions can differ from the meanings constructed at the 
societal level. Thus, we focus on the relationship between the loan manager and the 
entrepreneur as the unit of analysis. More specifically, we account for the institutional 
embeddedness of the social phenomenon of trust by investigating the impact of regulative 
and normative institutions on the power of trust for determining credit access in lending 
relationships. We concentrate on identification-based interpersonal trust within our unit of 
analysis (i.e. the relationship between loan manager and entrepreneur), because following the 
concept of embedded agency the institutional setting is reflected in the construction of 
meaning of their life-world within the interaction between loan manager and entrepreneur and 
is therefore accounted for when the individual actors form their intentions (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967). Trust on other levels as the interpersonal relationship and trust that is 
directed at subjects or objects other than the interaction partner therefore have to be 
interpreted as part of the institutional setting.  
 
3. Empirical Work: A Mixed-Methods Approach 
We used a sequential mixed-methods research strategy to investigate the empirical 
relevance of the effects of trust and the institutional context on credit access, which allowed 
for triangulation between and within the method types (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007; 
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Denzin 1978). Firstly, employing content analysis of narrative interviews with loan managers 
in a qualitative study, the core constructs of the argument were condensed and an 
understanding of the relationships between these constructs was identified. The findings of 
the qualitative study were then triangulated within the interviews and compared to the 
findings of previous studies to develop empirically testable hypotheses. Secondly, data were 
collected through a survey among loan managers to empirically test these hypotheses. 
Finally, the main findings were triangulated between the qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to enhance the degree of external validity and gain a holistic understanding of the 
complex phenomenon under study (Jick 1979). In both the qualitative and the quantitative 
analysis, the unit of analysis is the relationship between the loan manager and the respective 
entrepreneur. 
The research was conducted in South Tyrol and Friuli, two areas in north-east Italy. 
Both areas are considered rich in terms of their contributions to the Italian GDP and are 
characterised by many entrepreneurial firms, sometimes grouped into small industrial 
districts within which expertise and knowledge are easily transferred and shared. However, 
the two areas also show some differences: South Tyrol, a territory of 7,400 square kilometres 
and approximately 520,000 inhabitants with the capital Bozen and 116 municipalities, 
borders on Austria and was a part of Austria until 1920. 62 per cent of South Tyrol’s 
population belongs to the German linguistic group. Its roots lie mainly in German culture and 
traditions. In fact, the area is culturally and linguistically a small German enclave in Italy. 
Friuli spans a little over 8,000 square kilometres with a population close to a million 
inhabitants. Its capital is Udine. It borders on both Austria and Slovenia. In contrast to South 
Tyrol, this area’s culture and traditions are mainly rooted in Italian heritage.  
3.1. Qualitative Study: Towards Hypotheses Rooted in Context  
The first study follows an ‘interpretative qualitative’ approach (Gephart 2004), 
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focusing on the general mechanisms that can be understood through the in-depth analysis of 
specific situations (Moulaert and Nussbaumer 2005; Ramstad 1986; Sayer 1992). By looking 
at the narrations of loan managers, we identify core concepts that arise from the generalities 
within and differences between the specific cases. 
Content analysis of the material gathered (Mayring 2008) enables us to condense the 
concrete meaning of the core concepts and the relationships described in each of the 
narrations (Moulaert and Nussbaumer 2005). By identifying the cross-case patterns 
(Eisenhardt 1989) we develop a cross-case understanding of trust and the effects of trust on 
lending decisions within its institutional embeddedness. 
Case Selection and Data Collection 
Data were collected by direct field research, through narrative interviews (Lieblich et 
al. 1998) with eight loan managers, conducted in 2005 and 2006. In selecting interview 
partners, we strove towards collecting as diverse a set of perspectives as possible to identify 
the meanings behind the statements. Thus, we contacted six male and two female loan 
managers with diverse backgrounds (age, gender, educational background), from three banks 
in different locations. The interviews were conducted in places other than the interviewees’ 
workplaces to create a relaxed atmosphere. All interviews were audio-recorded and 
transcribed. This strategy of data collection also allowed us to analyse the data using the 
principle of case triangulation within the interviewees, enhancing internal consistency and 
reliability (Yin 2009). 
Findings: The Role of Trust in the Loan Managers’ Own Words Compared to the Literature 
As already discussed, trust is found to play a relevant role in business relationships 
(Barney and Hansen 1994; McAllister 1995; Friederike Welter 2012), even in financing 
relationships (Strätling et al. 2013). However, business relationships are also affected by the 
institutional environment, as it shapes the way in which people interact, what is considered 
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relevant to business decisions and how relationships evolve (Scott 2010). From the narrative 
interviews, two key aspects of the institutional environment arise. Firstly, whether the actors 
are located in South Tyrol or Friuli reflects the normative level of the relevant institutional 
environment. Secondly, the size of the bank reflects the relevant regulative environment of 
the loan managers. 
The insight that institutions are anchored in a specific place introduces a geographical 
scale to this theoretical approach (Friederike Welter and Trettin 2011). The perceptions and 
behaviour of economic actors are partly rooted in the local context (Bosma and Schutjens 
2011; Jennings et al. 2013). Thornton and Flynn (2003) show that economic practice is 
affected by the social boundaries of local communities, reflecting local norms and shared 
meanings. Sociological institutionalists stress the role of the interrelation between the social 
identity and norms prevailing in a specific place as factors that influence economic activity 
(Healey 2002; Richardson and Jensen 2003). Both Lang et al. (2013) and Kibler et al. (2015) 
highlight the role of place in institutional analyses in entrepreneurship research.  
In terms of normative institutions, South Tyrol is quite different to the rest of Italy. A 
good knowledge of German is important for working in the area and this affects the mobility 
of people from other parts of Italy. This fact has supported the development of a strong local 
community where everyone tends to know everyone else. Tight communities have been 
found to facilitate the development of trust (Tillmar 2006). In contrast, there is no linguistic 
barrier in Friuli: mobility is quite high and the communities are more open. As a 
consequence, it is not particularly unexpected that we can find several differences between 
the two areas regarding the institutional embeddedness of lending relationships. The role 
played by the social norms prevailing within the community seems to be more relevant in 
South Tyrol than in Friuli. This could be due to several reasons. Firstly, the higher mobility in 
Friuli (“The local community faces a relatively high turnover and many customers are quite 
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new to the area”) might adversely affect the chance that a loan manager will develop a strong 
relationship with a customer (“In the last ten years a lot of new people have moved in. You 
can meet only a fraction of them at Sunday mass or at the local Red Cross branch”), which, in 
turn, would help trust development (Burt and Knez 1996; Lewicki and Wiethoff 2000). In 
fact, the higher mobility implies that loan managers in Friuli are not as able to interact 
properly with customers to develop trust (“I wish I could trust my customers more but 
sometimes they are totally new to me and to the area: how can I trust them?”) as their 
colleagues in South Tyrol (“I have known the large majority of the population in the area 
since I was a child”). Thus, what appears to emerge is that loan managers in Friuli are more 
negative about their ability to use trust than their counterparts in South Tyrol. Secondly, loan 
managers are less strongly linked to the local community in Friuli and may therefore be 
unable to appreciate the entrepreneurs’ community involvement, a behaviour that 
demonstrates shared social norms. In contrast to the situation in South Tyrol, it is quite 
common for loan managers in Friuli to live outside the area where they work (“I spend my 
entire working day here but I live in a town 45 kilometres away. I guess I miss some relevant 
information about what happens around here”). Thus, compared to loan managers in Friuli, 
South Tyrolean loan managers adhere more strongly to the locally rooted social norms. 
Thirdly, loan managers tend to move from one branch to another more frequently in Friuli 
than in South Tyrol. Higher mobility affects the loan managers’ chances of developing long-
lasting relationships, as suggested by Scott (2006). All in all, differences in the regionally 
rooted normative institutional environment can affect loan managers’ ability to fully leverage 
trust, with Friuli at a disadvantage in comparison to South Tyrol. We therefore propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The positive effect of a loan manager’s trust in an entrepreneur on the 
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overall amount of credit granted is sensitive to the normative institutional 
environment prevailing in the place. 
 
Previous literature stresses that larger and smaller banks deal with customers 
differently (Berger et al. 2005): smaller banks are more likely to base their lending decision 
on private information than larger banks and to lend to small and entrepreneurial firms. The 
narrative interviews support these findings. We find that loan managers of smaller banks tend 
to exploit information over and above the information provided in annual financial statements 
and interim financial reports, which was sometimes considered unreliable: “I do not rely on 
official facts and figures. You know they are affected by tax strategy: asset value, work in 
progress, inventory – all rubbish. They are always adjusted. You know there are costs and 
revenues that are not recorded in the books. Entrepreneurs disclose them if you exert some 
pressure but you have no proof”. In addition, the loan managers of the small banks tended to 
stress the importance of accessing information from other sources, such as other customers 
(“You gain information about your client from other customers. They inform you about 
whether he is honest in his business relationships, his capabilities, etc.”), and told us that they 
exploit such information: “I have a lot of room for manoeuvre. In addition, when I cannot 
decide whether to give credit, I can always discuss things face-to-face with whoever is in 
charge of making the decision”. Thus, loan managers could exploit the trust they had in the 
customer, or transfer their evaluation of such trust to whoever is responsible for making the 
decision (“I typically share my opinions about the customer with the director”). In contrast, 
larger banks tended to rely on credit scoring systems (Berger and Udell 2006), which reduced 
the loan managers’ room for manoeuvre (“The credit scoring system decides whether we will 
provide credit to the customer”) (Scott 2006).  
In addition, the layers of command are more complex and articulated in larger banks 
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(Berger and Udell 2002), which increases the difficulty for the loan manager to transfer 
his/her personal opinion to whoever is in charge of making the decision (“For larger amounts, 
the decision is taken centrally. I have to send out all the documents but I do not know who is 
in charge of taking the decision”). Thus, the findings from the narrative interviews suggest 
that differences in the regulative institutional environment related to the size of the bank can 
affect the loan managers’ ability to leverage trust. Based on these arguments, we formulate 
the second hypothesis:  
 
H2: The positive effect of the loan manager’s trust in the entrepreneur on the 
overall amount of credit granted is sensitive to the regulative institutional 
environment prevailing in the banking organisation. 
 
Table 1 reports some quotations from the interviews and the derivation of the 
hypotheses. 
------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------- 
3.2. Quantitative Study: Testing the Hypotheses 
Method and Data 
The qualitative study gave us the opportunity to develop hypotheses rooted in the 
relevant context and in the literature, which we then tested using quantitative data. Nine 
banks participated in the data collection process between autumn 2005 and early 2007, six in 
South Tyrol (302 observations) and three in Friuli (148 observations). Together with the 
banks, the researchers selected a random sample of entrepreneurial firms from the customers 
of each bank. 
The selection process comprised the following steps: first, each bank generated a list 
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of small entrepreneurial firms, i.e. businesses with a turnover below €50 million, with fewer 
than 250 employees and with less than €43 million in total on the balance sheet, excluding 
agricultural firms (European Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC). Next, the bank 
sorted these customers, either alphabetically or based on a unique customer identification 
number. Finally, it picked every nth customer to be included in the sample. Since both types 
of sorting are independent of the customers’ characteristics and their relationships with the 
bank, the selection process generated a random sample. 
The banks asked their loan managers to fill in a questionnaire in which loan managers 
were asked to evaluate their level of trust in the entrepreneur. To achieve this, we follow 
Tinsley (1996)’s critique and adapt Mayer et al. (1995)’s model of trust by dropping the 
dimension “ability”. Trust is, thus, modelled as consisting of the following dimensions: (1) 
benevolence (i.e. the entrepreneur takes into consideration the interests of others), and (2) 
integrity (i.e. the entrepreneur is perceived to have high levels of commitment to the same 
norms and values as the loan manager). As shown in the interviews, benevolence is rooted in 
experience that has also been gained outside the business relationship. As a match between 
the interaction partners’ maxims, integrity is also independent of any information about the 
performance of the firm. When it comes to scale construction, we carefully selected items for 
measuring benevolence and integrity by relying on previous scales (Cummings and Bromiley 
1996; Mayer and Davies 1999). We pre-tested them by asking a group of loan managers, who 
were not involved in the later data collection, to fill in the survey and provide us with detailed 
feedback about the items. Two of the original items were regarded as vague and too close to 
other items. Thus, we decided to delete them from our inventory. The result is a list of items 
that are not affected by the amount of credit or other financial variables (Chenhall and Moers 
2007). In addition, the central loan office of each bank provided financial information about 
these firms from the bank’s information system. These information systems contain data 
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drawn from the public database maintained by the Italian Chamber of Commerce, which 
collects data from firms’ annual financial reports as well as from the Bank of Italy database 
(Centrale Rischi), in which the credit provided by banks to each of their customers is 
recorded and updated monthly.  
We ended up with 450 loan manager-entrepreneurial firm relationships. The final 
sample represents more than 1.5% of the overall population of entrepreneurial firms with 
lending relationships in the two areas considered.  
The analysis was carried out using STATA version 12. Factor analysis was employed 
to test whether a “trust” factor could be derived from the vector of items measuring the loan 
managers’ perceived benevolence and integrity of the entrepreneurs. We then tested the 
hypotheses by regressing the independent variables and the control variables against the 
overall amount of credit gained. The process was repeated for the sub-samples that depict the 
different institutional settings. Since standard ordinary least square regressions present issues 
linked to heteroscedasticity, the regressions were estimated using ordinary least squares with 
robust estimation of standard error. 
The Variables 
 Before illustrating and commenting on the results of the regression, we will briefly 
explain the variables used. 
Dependent Variable – Overall Amount of Credit: In contrast to previous studies on trust in 
lending relationships, which use the cost of credit or short-term credit as dependent variables 
(Harhoff and Körting 1998; Moro and Fink 2013), we use the overall amount of credit for the 
following reasons. First, if trust is as relevant as is suggested by our interviews, its role 
should be pervasive and therefore affect both long and short-term credit. Thus, by using the 
overall amount of credit, we approach the analysis of trust in a more conservative way. 
Secondly, cultural and social aspects are subject to short and long-term changes. Whereas 
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short-term changes mainly affect short-term credit decisions, historical social and cultural 
elements mainly affect long-term credit decisions. By looking at the overall amount of credit, 
we can take into consideration the impact of both short and long-term cultural and social 
changes on the credit obtained. Lastly, long-term debt is used for committed investments that 
are expected to generate profits for several years, whereas short-term debt is used for cash 
management or related activities that are mainly used for operative purposes only.  
To account for the fact that the variable is right skewed, we used the logarithm of the 
total debt (LN_TOTAL_DEBT). The original value is expressed in Euros. 
Independent Variables: The survey instrument measures the loan manager’s 
perception of identification-based interpersonal trust in the entrepreneur according to a vector 
of six items. Each item is based on previous inventories (Cummings and Bromiley 1996; 
Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Muthusamy and White 2005), measuring the willingness to take a 
counterpart’s interests into consideration (benevolence) and the ethical assumptions behind 
people’s behaviour (integrity). Each item was critically evaluated and pre-tested. The loan 
managers evaluated the individual items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘totally 
disagree’ (1) to ‘totally agree’ (5), except for the last item, where the responses ranged from 
‘I strongly advise against’ (1) to ‘I strongly advise in favour’ (5). The mode is 4 (‘I partially 
agree’) for all items, except for “The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of his/her 
employees” and “The entrepreneur is very involved in the community” for which the mode is 
3 (‘neither agree nor disagree’, representing the neutral response). The averages for the items 
range from 3.08 (“The entrepreneur is very involved in the community”) to 3.87 (“The 
entrepreneur is totally honest in negotiations with commercial partners”). 
Multivariate analysis showed that the item “The entrepreneur is very involved in the 
community” had low communality and we therefore dropped it from the principal 
components analysis (PCA). Thus, PCA was run on five items, resulting in a Cronbach’s 
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alpha of 0.8027, above the benchmarks suggested by Nunnally (1967). The first factor 
explains 56.82% of the variance and is the only one with an eigenvalue greater than 1 
(2.8410). Consequently, one factor is extracted and defined as TRUST. All the variables load 
at 0.7226 or more on the single component (the lowest is “The entrepreneur pays attention to 
the needs of the employees”). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test supports the adequacy of the 
sample (0.8292, above the suggested threshold limit). The scores were saved for inclusion in 
the regression analysis. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for each item and the results 
of the factor analysis. 
------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------- 
As banks in both areas are monitored by Banca d’Italia and must follow Italian law 
and Italian banking regulations, any emerging differences between the two regions studied 
must be ascribed to different normative institutions. To examine the impact of the normative 
institutions attached to the regions, we therefore used the dummy variable REGION (South 
Tyrol = 0, Friuli =1). Our expectation was that the dummy variable will be significant, if 
differences between the areas exist: if the normative institutional context in Friuli/South 
Tyrol is more supportive of credit access, the variable will have a positive/negative sign. To 
have a clearer picture of the impact of the normative institutional context on credit access we 
also re-ran the regression by splitting the dataset between the two regions. The normative 
institutional setting in South Tyrol is characterised by an especially strong social cohesion 
that is rooted in an exceptional civic citizenship fostered by “the awareness and acceptance of 
the idiosyncratic character of South Tyrolean society, i.e. its bi- or trilingualism, its 
institutional organisation, and its historical and cultural arrangements” (Medda-Windischer 
and Carlà 2013, p. 2). Thus, our expectation was that trust would be positive and significant 
in the South Tyrolean sub-sample, but insignificant in the Friuli sub-sample (H1). 
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To tackle the differences in the regulative pillar of the institutional setting, we account 
for the size of the bank that provides the loan to the entrepreneur. As the dataset contains 
observations from both large and small banks, we used the dummy variable BANK_SIZE to 
identify large (1) and small (0) banks. The banks classified as small operate very locally 
(typically in the municipality where they are headquartered and a few municipalities close to 
it), have a small number of branches (always less than 15), a very short line of command (the 
loan manager interacts directly with the general manager of the bank), and make very little 
use of credit scoring/credit rating tools. The banks classified as large operate at least at the 
regional level, have a greater number of branches (always more than 50), a more complex 
line of command (the loan manager does not interact directly with the general manager of the 
bank), and rely more on credit scoring/credit rating tools, even if they do not exclude the 
possibility of using private information either. If regulative institutions in large (small) banks 
are more supportive of credit, this variable will have a positive (negative) sign. To have a 
clearer picture of the role of trust in credit access in different size-related regulative 
institutional contexts, we re-ran the regression by splitting the dataset into large and small 
banks. In this case, our expectation was that trust would be positive and significant in small 
banks and not significant in large banks (H2). 
Control Variables: A set of control variables was included in the regressions to 
control for the economic environment, firm characteristics, and the characteristics of the 
relationship between the loan manager and the entrepreneur. To control for the economic 
environment, we used the Bank Lending Survey quarterly index (CL_INDEX) provided by 
the Bank of Italy, which takes values between -1 (a relaxed approach to providing credit to 
customers) and +1 (a rigid approach to providing credit to customers). To control for firm 
characteristics, we used the firm’s (log of) annual turnover (LN_TURNOVER), with the 
original value expressed in Euros, the firm’s return on sales (ROS = EBIT/Sales), the firm’s 
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assets turnover (ASS/TURN), and whether the loan is collateralised with firm collateral 
(FIRM_COLL) and/or personal collateral (PERS_COLL). Finally, to control for the 
relationship’s characteristics, we used the (log of the) length of the relationship 
(LN_LENGTH) between the bank and the firm, expressed in years, the number of people 
involved in the relationship at the bank level (BANK_EMP), the frequency with which the 
loan manager meets the firm (FREQ_MEET), and the frequency with which the credit is 
reviewed (FREQ_REV). It is important to point out that the length of the relationship is a 
dimension that is completely different from TRUST. This is because TRUST is based on 
personal evaluation, while the length of the relationship represents a fact. Further, on the 
logical level, the dimensions of TRUST are not linked to time, since they are rooted in the 
interaction partners’ norms, values and maxims, which are robust against time. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the variables. 
------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------- 
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3.3 Findings from Testing the Hypotheses 
We present three sets of regressions. The first set of regressions shows the findings for 
the overall sample, using both trust and the interaction between trust and region and trust and 
bank size respectively as independent variables. These regressions investigate the role of 
trust, place-bound social norms (normative institutions), and size-related regulations 
(regulative institutions) on the overall amount of credit. The second set of regressions aims at 
testing H1 and presents the results of the sub-samples for the different regions (South 
Tyrol/Friuli – different normative institutions). The third set of regressions aims at testing H2 
and presents the results of the sub-samples for different bank sizes (large/small banks – 
different regulative institutions). 
The regressions present some problems with heteroscedasticity, as the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity for the regression that includes all the 
covariates has a p=0.0848. Thus, the standard errors are produced using robust estimation. 
Table 4 reports the regressions that investigate the impact of trust, region and bank size on 
the overall amount of credit obtained.  
------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
------------------- 
The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) and the average VIF of each regression are 
reported in the table. No regression has a VIF higher than 10 and all average VIFs are very 
low, suggesting there are no problems with multicollinearity. 
The parsimonious version of the first regression is significant and has an R² of 0.4245. 
This regression does not present problems of multicollinearity (highest VIF – REGION: 3.92; 
mean VIF: 1.76). TRUST is significant at p<0.01 and is positively related to the overall 
amount of credit obtained. REGION is significant at p<0.05 and has a negative sign, 
indicating that the overall amount of credit obtained is lower among entrepreneurial firms in 
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Friuli. This finding tends to support our hypothesis that regional differences in normative 
institutions affect entrepreneurial firms’ credit access. BANK_SIZE is significant at p<0.01 
and has a negative sign, indicating that the overall amount of credit obtained is lower in 
entrepreneurial firms that borrow from large banks. This finding tends to support our 
hypothesis that differences in regulative institutions between large and small banks impact on 
their lending practices. All in all, the regressions provide initial support for the argument that 
the size-related regulative institutions and the regionally rooted normative institutions affect 
the amount of credit obtained by entrepreneurial firms. 
To implement a first test for H1 and H2 we estimate the original regression including 
the interaction between trust-region and trust-bank size. The regression is significant and has 
an R2 of 0.4248. No changes emerge in the sign and significance level of the covariates. 
Interestingly, TRUST is significant at p<.05, whereas the interactions between trust and 
region (Friuli = 1) and trust and bank size (large bank = 1) are not. This finding suggests that 
trust is not relevant in large banks and in Friuli (the interaction variables), while it is relevant 
and impacts on the overall amount of credit obtained in small banks and in South Tyrol. 
Initially, both H1 and H2 thus seem to be supported. 
To have a more detailed insight into the role of trust on credit access in different 
regions and differently sized banks, we re-estimate the regressions on the split dataset. 
To test H1 we first look for differences in the normative institutional environments 
between the two regional sub-samples South Tyrol and Friuli. We ran a t-test on the 
dependent variable, the length of the relationship, and turnover. No differences emerge at 
p<0.01 for either the overall amount of credit obtained or turnover, but the lengths of the 
relationship differ significantly. Whereas the average length of the relationship is 12.03 years 
in South Tyrol, it is 6.87 years in Friuli. There is no significant difference in the level of 
TRUST between the two samples (p<0.01), although trust seems to be slightly higher in 
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South Tyrol (average 0.128 vs. 0.026 in Friuli). This suggests that the loan managers’ trust in 
entrepreneurs is not significantly affected by the local normative institutions. 
Second, we re-estimate the regression on the South Tyrolean and Friuli sub-samples. 
Table 4 reports the results. The regressions have an R² of 0.4035 (South Tyrol) and 0.5854 
(Friuli), and are significant at p<0.01. They do not present problems of multicollinearity. 
Interestingly, the level of TRUST is positively related to the overall amount of credit 
obtained in both samples, but TRUST is only significant in the South Tyrolean context. Trust 
hence affects the amount of credit obtained differently according to the local normative 
institutions. This finding is in line with the result of the regression that considers the 
interaction of trust with the region and with the qualitative prediction that bank managers in 
Friuli might find it more difficult to develop and use trust in their lending relationships with 
firms. The econometric findings therefore provide further support for H1. 
Turning our attention to the role of trust in banks of different sizes (H2), we 
implement a t-test on the dependent variable, the length of the relationship and turnover to 
verify whether the two sub-samples are similar. No difference emerges at p<0.01. Then, we 
examine whether differences between large and small banks arise regarding the level of loan 
managers’ trust in entrepreneurs. The level of trust is not significantly different between the 
two sub-samples (p<0.01), although it seems to be slightly higher in large banks (average 
0.038 vs. -0.008 in small ones). This finding is very interesting, since it suggests that the loan 
managers’ lending decisions are not affected by the size-related regulative institutional 
environment in which they work. 
Then, we re-estimate the regression using the sub-samples of large and small banks. 
These regressions have an R² of 0.3978 (small banks) and 0.5453 (large banks) respectively; 
are both significant at p<0.01; and they do not suffer from any problems with 
multicollinearity. Our findings show that TRUST is positively related to the overall amount 
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of credit in both samples. However, even though TRUST is significant at p<0.01 in the case 
of small banks, it is not significant in the case of large banks. These findings are in line with 
both the results of the regression that includes the interaction between trust and bank size and 
the qualitative evidence. H2 is hence supported. Interestingly, the similar level of trust in 
entrepreneurs from the loan managers of large and small banks suggests that it is the lending 
approach used by large banks that constrains the leverage of trust. The very marginal role of 
trust in the lending process of large banks can only be attributed to large banks’ reluctance to 
allow loan managers to exploit the trust they have in their entrepreneurial customers, as it 
cannot be attributed to different trust evaluations being made by the loan managers of large 
and small banks. This finding supports what emerged in the interviews. In contrast to loan 
managers of small banks, loan managers of large banks emphasised that their relationships 
with entrepreneurs were more impersonal and that lending decisions were based on financial 
information.  
Robustness Checks - Endogeneity 
 It could be argued that our analysis suffers from endogeneity: by measuring trust we 
might in fact measure something else, namely the length of the relationship or the 
information that the loan manager can access. Since trust needs time to evolve and is also 
based on the information that the loan manager obtains, such criticism might be correct. To 
check for this potential issue, we re-estimate our regressions instrumenting trust with the 
length of the relationship and four variables that measure the level of information provided 
(namely quality, quantity, timeliness and completeness of the information obtained by the 
entrepreneurial firm). These four dimensions are measured according to a 5-point Likert-type 
scale. The results are reported in table 5. 
------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
------------------- 
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Interestingly, instrumented trust is not significant in any of the regressions, suggesting 
that by entering trust we are in fact measuring trust and not the length of the relationship or 
the information accessed by the loan managers. We re-estimate the specification of table 5 
including the length of the relationship only (results not reported here), but we do not see a 
change in the results. Correspondingly, we also include only the four variables that measure 
the level of information provided (results not reported here). Also in this case, instrumented 
trust is not significant. 
 
4. Discussion 
Traditional agency theory suggests that the conflict of interests between the lender 
(principal) and the borrower (agent) is curbed “ex post” by the development of legal tools 
(detailed contracts) that align the behaviour of the agent with the behaviour expected by the 
principal. Interestingly, the suggested mechanisms are not without cost and cannot 
completely reconcile the agent’s and the principal’s objectives. One of the negative effects of 
these tools is that they do not support the development of strong relationships between the 
contracting parties (Strätling et al. 2013). For example, very stringent contracts and requests 
for personal collateral can be perceived as excessive intrusiveness by entrepreneurs, reducing 
their voluntary disclosure of information – labelled passive opportunistic behaviour by 
Wathne and Heide (2000). Such behaviour by entrepreneurs might reinforce the loan 
managers’ view that they are being provided with partial information of poor quality. It might 
therefore adversely affect the evaluation of the firm, triggering a more conservative approach 
to providing credit to it (e.g. refusing new credit, reducing current credit, etc.). All in all, 
traditional tools can produce a non-cooperative game in which players tend to cheat each 
other by behaving opportunistically (Axelrod 1981), increasing agency problems instead of 
reducing them. However, in relationship lending, agency problems can be avoided “ex ante” 
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by leveraging trust based on perceived benevolence and integrity. At the same time, the use 
of control mechanisms and sanctions that banks use to force entrepreneurs to behave in the 
banks’ interests can be reduced, producing savings. 
In line with the insights from the qualitative study, our econometric results show a 
positive effect of loan managers’ trust in their entrepreneurial clients on the overall amount of 
credit granted. Interestingly, the quantitative analysis suggests that this effect is sensitive to 
both different place-bound normative and size-related regulative institutions. Entrepreneurs 
who credibly communicate their trustworthiness to loan managers can better bridge the 
finance gap and survive critical situations. This strategy is more successful with small banks 
and in areas where the relationship between the loan manager and the entrepreneur is 
stronger. 
The findings support our assumption about the main mechanism underlying the 
positive effects of interpersonal trust on credit access: relationship lending. As expressed in 
the label, “relationship lending” is a lending technique that draws on information generated in 
the loan managers’ relationship with the client for the evaluation of the creditworthiness of an 
entrepreneur. In line with our expectations, close relationships that are commonly found in 
regions with tight-knit social fabrics breed stronger trust relationships (Medda-Windischer 
and Carlà 2013) that give access to more information. As a consequence, relationship lending 
is more effective. However, loan managers need to be granted sufficient leeway in their 
decision-making power to be able to effectively leverage the information accessed through 
the social relationships with their clients. We find smaller banks make better use of their 
relational information base.          
The robustness of the trust-credit access relationship might be a result of the historical 
development of humanistic thinking. Humanity attributes the self-commitment of individuals 
to a certain set of ethical maxims that developed in Europe and North America during the 
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Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries, even if they are rooted in Greek (Aristotle 2012) 
and Christian (Aquinas 2009) philosophy. However, this stream of philosophy seems to be 
set aside by economists. They tend to implicitly rely on Hobbes (1651), who argues that the 
natural state of Man is war of all against all and that civil society was developed to deal with 
such a state. Hobbes’ arguments suggest that Man is inherently selfish, and such selfishness 
is taken as an assumption by economists such as Friedman (1970). As pillars of perceived 
trustworthiness, benevolence and integrity are core concepts in humanistic thinking. 
Benevolence is rooted in the idea that every person is unconditionally valuable (Coleman 
2007; Korsgaard 1996). From this value, the norm is derived that interaction partners should 
be approached in a kind, benevolent way that does not harm them. Integrity is derived from 
the idea of an individual’s autonomy in moral reasoning. Integrity can be described as self-
determination with regards to maxims, which are in turn shaped by the institutional 
environment (Fink and Harms 2012; Fink and Kessler 2010). Both concepts – benevolence 
and integrity – restrict the economic actor in terms of cheating on business partners. Thus, 
those who build their behaviour on the grounds of humanity are well-equipped to evolve 
trust-based relationships. 
All in all, the empirical results suggest that trust plays an important role in granting 
entrepreneurs access to credit. A trust-based approach to lending relationships might lower 
transaction and compliance costs for both parties when they jointly commit to a shared 
interpretation of their life-world (Berger and Luckmann 1967) and on this shared ground 
form compatible intentions that translate into favourable sequences of action. This calls for a 
holistic approach to assessing the embedded agents who interact in the lending relationship 
over and above the economic dimension, rather than focusing solely on exchanges taking 
place at a given place at a given point in time.  
 
 30 
5. Conclusion  
 This study is one of the few that addresses the role of trust in lending relationships 
and the first to consider the institutional embeddedness of trust and its impact on lending 
relationships. It shows both qualitatively and quantitatively the importance of loan managers’ 
trust in their entrepreneurial customers for credit access, and the role of trust as a tool to 
mitigate the finance gap entrepreneurial firms face. We find that both the regulative 
institutions related to the size of the bank and the normative institutions rooted in the place in 
which the bank is located influence the impact of trust on credit access. 
 The literature on social capital shows that norms of reciprocity and mutual trust are 
cornerstones of a functioning economy, as they are prerequisites for collective intentions 
(Searle 1990; Sugden and Hollis 1993) and for collective action (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 
2002; Krishna 2002). Anderson and Jack (2002) elaborated the structural and relational 
aspects to be dimensions in the process that creates a condition of social capital in an 
entrepreneurial context. Also, Granovetter (1985) criticises the “undersocialised conception 
of human behaviour” (p. 483) in the governance approaches of New Institutional Economics, 
and stresses the fact that, in their behaviour, individuals are strongly influenced by the social 
context in which they are embedded. All in all, acting according to the norms of humanity is 
an individual behavioural choice taken within the framework of the institutional environment. 
Our findings provide another jigsaw piece adding to the empirical evidence supporting the 
institutional embeddedness of trust-based relationships and their effects, without over-
contextualising. 
This study examines the role of trust cross-sectionally. To further examine the role of 
trust in lending relationships it would be beneficial to analyse the topic longitudinally, by 
exploring how trust evolves over time as the customer’s situation changes for the better or for 
the worse. In addition, this research relies on quite a small dataset and investigates the 
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sensitivity of the role of trust to the institutional context along two dimensions only. 
However, the dataset is large enough to test the generalisability of the insights from the 
qualitative study across more than one institutional environment, and the selection of the two 
aspects of the institutional environment studied was not random, but based on the qualitative 
analysis. The essential role of the context in which trust evolves highlights the importance of 
replicating the analysis in other institutional contexts to grasp the full impact of the 
institutional environment on trust perceptions and their effects on lending relationships. 
Further, as this aspect was not raised by the interviewees, the dark side of trust was not 
included within the scope of this research. The negative aspects of trust, however, come into 
play as soon as the collective or individual performance of the trust-based relationship comes 
under research. While this will be a fruitful next step, as guided by Bachmann, Gillespie and 
Priem (2015), along the avenue of future research, it was not within the focus of this study. 
Finally, further research is needed to verify what happens at the beginning of the lending 
relationship, when loan managers either cannot rely on trust at all (because they do not know 
the customer) or should exploit trust that has been developed outside their business 
relationship. 
Notwithstanding the limitations, this study indicates that trust plays a more important 
role in lending relationships than has been acknowledged so far. 
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Table 1 – Interview Data and Derivation of Hypotheses 
 
Code Quotation from interviews Aspect Hypothesis 
Q1 “The local community faces a relatively high turnover and many customers are quite new to the area.” Friuli 
H1: The positive effect of 
loan managers’ trust in the 
entrepreneur on the overall 
amount of credit is sensitive 
to the normative 
institutional environment 
prevailing in the region. 
Q2 “I have known the large majority of the population in the area since I was a child.” South Tyrol 
Q3 “In the last ten years, a lot of new people have moved in. You can meet only a fraction of them at Sunday mass or in the local Red Cross.” Friuli 
Q4 “I spend my entire working day here but I live in a town 45 kilometres away. I guess I miss some relevant information about 
what happens around here.” Friuli 
Q5 “I wish I could trust my customers more but sometimes they are totally new to me and to the area: how can you trust them?” Friuli 
Q6 “I was born here. I spent my childhood with many of the bank customers.” South Tyrol 
Q7 
“I do not rely on official facts and figures. You know they are affected by the tax strategy. Asset value, work in progress, 
inventory – all rubbish. They are always adjusted. You know there are costs and revenues that are not recorded in the books. 
Entrepreneurs disclose them if you exert some pressure but you have no proof.”  
Small bank 
H2: The positive effect of 
loan managers’ trust in the 
entrepreneur on the overall 
amount of credit is sensitive 
to the regulative 
institutional environment 
prevailing in the banking 
organisation. 
Q8 “You gain information about your client from other customers. They inform you whether he is honest in his business 
relationships, his capabilities, etc.”  Small bank 
Q9 “The credit scoring system decides whether to provide credit to the customer.” Large bank 
Q10 “I have a lot of room for manoeuvre. In addition, when I cannot decide whether to give credit I can always discuss things face-to-face with whoever is in charge of making the decision.” Small bank 
Q11 “For larger amounts, the decision is taken centrally. I have to send out all the documents but I do not know who is in charge 
of making the decision.” Large bank 
Q12 “I typically share my opinion about the customer with the director.” Small bank 
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Table 2 – Factor Analysis of Trust Items 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Factor Trust Uniqueness 
benevolence (ben1) 
The entrepreneur adapts his 
interests to suit those of 
commercial partners. 
3.7812 0.6948 0.7900 0.3759 
benevolence (ben2) The entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of the employees. 3.5405 0.7485 0.7226 0.4779 
benevolence (ben3) The entrepreneur is very involved in the community. 3.0853 1.1695    
integrity (int1) 
The entrepreneur is totally honest 
in negotiations with commercial 
partners. 
3.8753 0.7223 0.7561 0.4282 
integrity (int2) The entrepreneur is consistent in his decisions and behaviour. 3.8096 0.6921 0.7616 0.4200 
integrity (int3) 
Would you be happy to 
recommend to a female friend that 
she should work at the firm? 
3.4354 0.9509 0.7369 0.4570 
 
  
 45 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Code Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
LN_TOT_DEBT1 Overall amount of credit2  529,552 1,053,752 5,000 14,400,000 1.000            
FIRM_COLL Firm collateral (dummy) 0.2500  0.433 0  1.000 0.298 1.000           
PERS_COLL Private collateral (dummy) 0.8110  0.392 0  1.000 0.058 0.041 1.000          
CL_INDEX Expected contraction in credit 
provided (Bank of Italy index)  
0.0598  0.053 0   0.700 -0.021 0.050 -0.050 1.000         
LN_TURNOVER1 Turnover 2 2,205,061 4,629,894 13,000 46,900,000 0.266 0.018 0.015 -0.113 1.000        
ROS Return on sales  0.0505  0.091 -0.528  0.470 -0.026 -0.042 -0.028 -0.154 -0.072 1.000       
ASS/TURN Assets/Turnover  1.4905  3.594 .1100  42.467 -0.043 0.107 -0.063 0.298 -0.163 0.100 1.000      
FREQ_REV Frequency of reviewing  2.0416  0.483 1.000  3.000 0.322 0.204 0.080 -0.301 0.128 0.021 -0.018 1.000     
FREQ_MEET Frequency of meetings  2.9540  1.227 1.000  4.000 0.097 0.182 0.004 0.122 -0.013 -0.059 0.035 0.246 1.000    
BANK_EMP Number of bank employees 
involved in the relationship  
1.5885  1.155 1.000  7.000 0.005 0.010 0.029 0.140 -0.111 0.102 0.011 -0.124 -0.104 1.000   
BANK_SIZE Bank size (small, 0, large, 1) 0.1860  0.390  00  1.000 -0.162 -0.065 0.013 0.090 -0.088 -0.057 0.025 -0.080 0.159 -0.234 1.000  
REGION Region (0: South Tyrol; 1: 
Friuli) 
0.3282  0.470 0  1.000 -0.131 -0.045 -0.010 0.432 -0.086 -0.040 0.014 -0.075 0.196 -0.219 0.681 1.000 
TRUST Trust (benevolence + integrity) 0.0000  1.000 - 4.388  2.286 0.095 0.009 -0.085 0.022 0.088 -0.014 0.023 0.050 0.081 0.037 0.017 -0.023 
1 The values reported in the descriptive statistics are the original ones. In the regression, the logarithms of the variables have been entered. 
2
 These values are expressed in Euros. 
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Table 4 – Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: (Ln of) Overall amount of credit; Independent variables: Firm collateral (dummy), Private collateral (dummy), Bank of Italy index about the expected contraction in credit provided, 
(Ln of) Turnover, Return on sales, Assets/Turnover, (Ln of) Length, Frequency of reviewing, Frequency of meetings, Number of bank employees involved, Bank size (small:0, large:1), Region (South 
Tyrol:0; Friuli:1), Trust (benevolence + integrity), Interaction Trust Region, Interaction Trust Bank. 
 
 
  
450 450 302 148 366 84
28.46 24.83 23.15 18.56 23.96 11.9
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.4245 0.4248 0.4035 0.5854 0.3978 0.5453
1.0417 1.0439 1.1354 0.75314 1.1013 0.67526
Variable Code
Coef. Robust Std. Errors P>t Coef.
Robust Std. 
Errors P>t Coef.
Robust 
Std. Errors P>t Coef.
Robust 
Std. Errors Coef. Coef.
Robust 
Std. 
Errors
Coef. Coef.
Robust 
Std. 
Errors
Coef.
Firm collateral (dummy) FIRM_COLL 1.0371 0.1078 *** 1.0312 0.1077 *** 1.1888 0.1375 *** 0.7397 0.1595 *** 1.0999 0.1253 *** 0.8782 0.2006 ***
Private collateral (dummy) PERS_COLL 0.0213 0.1294 0.0206 0.1307 0.2083 0.1728 -0.2643 0.1622 0.0882 0.1520 -0.0473 0.2184
Expected contraction in credit provided CL_INDEX 7.4648 1.7008 *** 7.4851 1.7068 *** 7.8896 2.5146 *** 7.5336 2.0591 *** 7.8746 1.7848 *** (omitted)
Turnover (natural logarithm) LN_TURNOVER 0.3533 0.0404 *** 0.3531 0.0405 *** 0.3083 0.0528 *** 0.4850 0.0535 *** 0.3309 0.0476 *** 0.4783 0.0588 ***
Return on sales ROS 0.1239 0.4054 0.0967 0.4105 0.3183 0.7041 -0.7231 0.5504 *** 0.3153 0.5758 -1.1855 0.6298 ***
Assets/Turnover ASS/TURN -0.0016 0.0151 -0.0019 0.0151 -0.0112 0.0194 0.1884 0.0408 -0.0087 0.0146 0.2227 0.0561
Length (natural logarithm) LN_LENGTH -0.0193 0.0652 -0.0192 0.0652 0.0139 0.0812 -0.1182 0.1067 0.0079 0.0765 -0.1539 0.1098
Frequency of reviewing FREQ_REV 0.9194 0.1313 *** 0.9238 0.1320 *** 0.9541 0.1645 *** 0.5585 0.1912 *** 0.9378 0.1484 *** 0.6946 0.2477 ***
Frequency of meetings FREQ_MEET 0.0721 0.0460 0.0731 0.0462 0.0780 0.0625 0.0608 0.0555 0.0650 0.0529 0.0833 0.0735
Number of bank employees involved BANK_EMP 0.0331 0.0497 0.0347 0.0500 0.0136 0.0532 0.1649 0.1463 0.0216 0.0508 -0.0720 0.6734
Bank size (small:0, large:1) BANK_SIZE -0.2334 0.1663 *** -0.2387 0.1722 (omitted) -0.2480 0.1993
Region (South Tyrol:0;  Friuli:1) REGION -0.4346 0.1711 ** -0.4321 0.1763 ** -0.4646 0.1764 *** (omitted)
Trust (benevolence + integrity) TRUST 0.1463 0.0488 *** 0.1341 0.0566 ** 0.1471 0.0595 ** 0.1448 0.0908 0.1519 0.0552 *** 0.1155 0.0922
Interaction Trust Region TRUST_REG 0.0446 0.1435
Interaction Trust Bank TRUST_BANK 0.0027 0.1649
Constant _cons 4.7672 0.6675 *** 4.7584 0.6702 *** 5.0571 0.8559 *** 3.4746 0.9809 *** 4.9315 0.7671 *** 3.5754 1.2159 ***
Highest VIF 3.92 3.97 3.86 2.08 3.59 1.43
Mean VIF 1.76 1.86 1.66 1.36 1.57 1.23
* <.10
** <.05
*** <.01
Cl_index Bank Size Cl_index ROS
Root MSE Root MSE Root MSE Root MSE Root MSE
Region
Root MSE
Region
R-squared R-squared R-squared R-squared
Prob > F Prob > F Prob > F Prob > F Prob > FProb > F
R-squaredR-squared
F(11, 290) F(12, 135) F(12, 353) F(10,73)
Number of obs Number of obs Number of obs Number of obs Number of obsNumber of obs
F(15, 434)F(13, 436)
Sample Split by Region Sample Split by Bank Size
Starting Model South Tyrol Banks Friuli Banks Small Banks Large BanksInteraction Model
Overall Sample
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Table 5 – Instrumented regressions 
 
Dependent variable: (Ln of) Overall amount of credit; Independent variables: Firm collateral (dummy), Private collateral (dummy), Bank of Italy index about the expected contraction in credit provided, 
(Ln of) Turnover, Return on sales, Assets/Turnover, (Ln of) Length, Frequency of reviewing, Frequency of meetings, Number of bank employees involved, Bank size (small:0, large:1), Region (South 
Tyrol:0;  Friuli:1), Instrumented Trust using (Ln of) length, quality, quantity, completeness and timeliness of information. 
 
 
449 301 148 365 84
382.76 266.14 244 299.97 128.99
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.4226 0.4016 0.5841 0.3964 0.537
1.0259 1.1133 0.7204 1.0818 0.6352
Variable Code Coef.
Robust 
S td. Errors P>t Coef.
Robust 
Std. Errors P>t Coef.
Robust 
S td. Errors P>t Coef.
Robust 
Std. Errors P>t Coef.
Robust 
S td. Errors P>t
Instrumented Trust I_TRUST 0.1117 0.0731 0.1244 0.0971 0.0994 0.1129 0.1417 0.0850 0.0094 0.1341
Firm collateral (dummy) FIRM_COLL 1.0275 0.1060 *** 1.1723 0.1367 *** 0.7570 0.1532 *** 1.0904 0.1235 *** 0.9046 0.1893 ***
Private collateral (dummy) PERS_COLL 0.0265 0.1300 0.2198 0.1744 -0.2718 0.1569 0.1003 0.1531 -0.0379 0.2055
Expected contraction in credit provided CL_INDEX 7.5967 1.6703 *** 8.1347 2.4672 *** 7.5558 1.9781 *** 7.9782 1.7506 *** (omitted) ***
Turnover (natural logarithm) LN_T URNOVER 0.3581 0.0404 *** 0.3133 0.0524 *** 0.4896 0.0512 *** 0.3346 0.0476 *** 0.4804 0.0550 ***
Return on sales ROS 0.1322 0.3967 0.3006 0.7029 -0.6965 0.5112 0.3184 0.5708 -1.1306 0.5459
Assets/Turnover ASS/T URN -0.0022 0.0148 -0.0127 0.0190 0.1907 0.0383 *** -0.0092 0.0143 0.2315 0.0529 ***
Length (natural logarithm) LN_LENGTH -0.0144 0.0650 0.0162 0.0813 -0.1110 0.1031 0.0080 0.0761 -0.1332 0.1076
Frequency of reviewing FREQ_REV 0.9152 0.1293 *** 0.9548 0.1623 *** 0.5444 0.1814 *** 0.9326 0.1465 *** 0.6634 0.2331 ***
Frequency of meetings FREQ_MEET 0.0732 0.0455 0.0776 0.0614 0.0578 0.0536 0.0647 0.0522 0.0751 0.0710
Number of bank employees involved BANK_EMP 0.0360 0.0495 0.0154 0.0535 0.1513 0.1445 0.0229 0.0508 -0.1923 0.6587
Bank size (small:0, large:1) BANK_SIZE -0.2141 0.1653 (omitted) -0.2363 0.1901
Region (South Tyrol:0;  Friuli:1) REGION -0.4479 0.1683 *** -0.4719 0.1735 *** (omitted)
Constant _cons 4.6812 0.6704 *** 4.9643 0.8632 *** 3.4425 0.9429 *** 4.8750 0.7739 *** 3.7141 1.1744 ***
* <.10
** <.05
*** <.01
Overall Sample
Starting Model
Number of obs
Wald chi2(13)
Prob > chi2 Prob > chi2
R-squared
Root MSE
R-squared
Root M SE
Prob > chi2
R-squared
Root MSE
Sample Split by Region
South Tyrol Banks Friuli Banks
Number of obs
Wald chi2(12)
Sample Split by Bank Size
Small Banks Large Banks
Number of obs
Wald chi2(11)
Number of obs
Wald chi2(12)
R-squared
Root MSE
Number of obs
Wald chi2(10)
Prob > chi2
R-squared
Root MSE
Prob > chi2
